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Abstract: 
 In August of 1814, a New York farmer named Jacob E. Mott refused to rendezvous with 
the militia pursuant to the orders of Governor Daniel D. Tompkins as commanded by President 
James Madison.  In 1818, Mott was court martialed and fined ninety-six dollars.  One year later, 
Mott brought an action in replevin in the New York state courts to recover chattel taken from 
him by a deputy marshal in lieu of the ninety-six dollars.  Both the New York trial and appellate 
courts sided with Mott.  In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Joseph Story, the Supreme 
Court of the United States reversed and held the marshal’s avowry sufficient.  Justice Story’s 
opinion reiterated the authority of the federal executive, and began a line of cases that 
culminated in our modern approach to unilateral executive emergency powers. 
 
Disciplines: 
 Law, executive powers, emergency powers, constitutional history, the Marshall Court. 
 
The Congress shall have power … to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make 
rules concerning captures on land and water.1 
 
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.2 
 
The President shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the 
militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States.3 
 
Justice Joseph Story’s opinion in Martin v. Mott4 addressed a case exemplary of the very 
transition occasioned by the War of 1812.  The case was a veritable microcosm of themes 
defining American civilization during the early nineteenth century.  The factual cause of Martin 
                                                 
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
4 25 U.S. 19 (1827). 
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v. Mott hints at the partisan-induced fractures of pre-war America, and Justice Story’s opinion 
alludes to an (albeit, briefly) unified and increasingly militarized global power.  Part I of this 
paper examines the fractured political world that gave birth to Martin v. Mott, with a focus on the 
War of 1812.  Part II discusses the major players in the case, including the parties and their 
counsel.  Part III analyzes the factual and procedural underpinnings of the case, the Court’s 
reasoning, and the decision’s enduring significance. 
At first glance, Martin v. Mott seems to involve a yeoman farmer defying the powerful 
will of the political establishment.  Indeed, the factual basis of the case revolves around New 
York farmer Jacob E. Mott’s refusal to rendezvous with the militia and thereby enter into the 
service of his country.5  To characterize Mott as a mere dispute over chattel is to unrealistically 
isolate the case from the various social and political forces pervading life in early nineteenth 
century America.  The War of 1812 was a fantastically unpopular conflict which the young 
country was incredibly unprepared for.6  Furthermore, the militia system was itself a political 
battlefield, with state governments contesting the constitutional basis for federal control.7  In 
short, the case occurred during a time of national crisis.  The lasting legacy of Mott reflects the 
environment from whence it arose. 
I. THE WAR OF 1812 
a. Catalysts and Causes 
                                                 
5 Id. 
6 See generally WHAT SO PROUDLY WE HAILED: ESSAYS ON THE CONTEMPORARY MEANING OF 
THE WAR OF 1812 (Pietro S. Nivola & Peter J. Kastor eds., 2012). 
7 C. EDWARD SKEEN, CITIZEN SOLDIERS IN THE WAR OF 1812, at 141 (1999). 
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Several nuisances particularly aggravated Americans in the years preceding the War of 
1812, including impressment and British provocations on the frontier.8  These factors were 
further flamed by a war hawk Congress.9 
Foremost among many Americans’ grievances with their former colonial rulers was the 
practice of impressment.10  A favored practice of the Royal Navy, impressment involved 
stopping American ships and forcing any able-bodied man into prolonged service for Her 
Majesty.11  Although legally impressed recruits had to be English subjects, the crown adhered to 
the mantra of “once an Englishman, always an Englishman.”12  As such, many young Americans 
found themselves forced into the Royal Navy.13  In 1807, then Secretary of State James Madison 
lambasted the practice as “anomalous in principle, grievous in practice, and abominable in 
abuse” and demanded it be ceased.14  The British foreign secretary derisively responded that the 
“[p]retension advanced by Mr. Madison that the American Flag should protect every Individual 
sailing under it … is too extravagant to require any serious Refutation.”15   
Impressments continued, as did flagrant British disregard for American neutrality.  
Indeed, war almost commenced in the spring of 1807 when HMS Leopard stopped, fired on, and 
then searched USS Chesapeake for British deserters.16  Even staunch anti-war Federalists such as 
                                                 
8 Pietro S. Nivola, The “Party War” of 1812: Yesterday’s Lessons for Today’s Partisan Politics, 
in WHAT SO PROUDLY WE HAILED: ESSAYS ON THE CONTEMPORARY MEANING OF THE WAR OF 
1812, at 18 (Pietro S. Nivola & Peter J. Kastor eds., 2012). 
9 Id. 
10 WALTER R. BORNEMAN, 1812: THE WAR THAT FORGED A NATION 19 (2005). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 20. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 JOHN A. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 189–90 
(1966). 
16 BORNEMAN, supra note 10, at 21–23. 
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John Adams decried the incident: “[n]o nation … can be Independent which suffers her Citizens 
to be stolen from her at the discretion of the Naval or military officers of another.”17  In response, 
President Thomas Jefferson enacted an economic embargo and banned British ships from 
American ports—the first in a series of experimental economic sanctions..18 
While impressment rankled Americans, it was not the sole cause of the War of 1812.  
Some saw war as an opportunity, perhaps through annexation of Canada, to weaken British 
support for Native Americans who threatened American settlements in the northwest.19  Indeed, 
a myriad of reasons underlie what was a truly peculiar conflagration.  Virginia’s John Taylor 
described the War of 1812 as “a metaphysical war, a war not for conquest, not for defense, not 
for sport …a war for honour, like that of the Greeks against Troy” but nonetheless, a war that 
might “terminate in the destruction of the last experiment … in free government.”20 
b. The Declaration of War 
On June 18, 1812, the United States declared war on Great Britain.21  America was 
indisputably and laughably unprepared.  Indeed, a mere three days prior to the declaration of 
war, John Adams mockingly described the American Navy as “so Lilliputian … that Gulliver 
might bury it in the deep by making water on it.”22  In this light, the timing of the decision was 
                                                 
17 PIERRE BERTON, THE INVASION OF CANADA, 1812-1813, at 37 (1980). 
18 Nivola, supra note 8, at 9. 
19 Id. at 12. 
20 NORMAN K. RISJORD, THE OLD REPUBLICANS: SOUTHERN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF 
JEFFERSON 145 (1965). 
21 GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 674 (2009). 
22 Stephen Budiansky, The War of 1812 and the Rise of American Military Power, in WHAT SO 
PROUDLY WE HAILED: ESSAYS ON THE CONTEMPORARY MEANING OF THE WAR OF 1812, at 36, 36 
(Pietro S. Nivola & Peter J. Kastor eds., 2012) (quoting Letter from John Adams to John Adams 
Smith, June 15, 1812, Microfilms of the Adams Papers (Boston: Massachusetts Historical 
Society: 1954-59), reel 118). 
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especially questionable—particularly as the alleged American grievances were not new.23  The 
United States Navy, comprised of fewer than twenty warships and 3,600 seamen, was tasked 
with fighting the mightiest naval superpower in the world.24  With over 1000 warships—ninety 
of which were already stationed in and around North American waters—and 145,000 sailors and 
marines, the Royal Navy was as large as the rest of the world’s navies combined.25  American 
chances were no more favorable on land.  At the start of the conflict, the United States Army 
amounted to 7,000 individuals; Britain boasted a force of a quarter million.26 
Besides the extreme disparity in fighting forces, the American declaration of war is even 
more perplexing given that the British neither expected nor wanted war.27  In fact, the British 
government repealed the official orders-in-council authorizing the seizure of American ships and 
the impressment of American sailors almost simultaneously with the American declaration of 
war; that said, the British reserved the authority of impressing sailors in light of the struggle 
against the Napoleonic Empire.28  Britain’s minister to Washington, Augustus Foster, had been 
striving to avoid a military conflict.  Prior to the declaration of war, Foster wooed congressional 
Republicans with promises of friendship and a hefty entertainment expense account.29  
Following the declaration of war, Foster, still confident that war would be avoided, informed 
London that it was merely an American bluff.30 
                                                 
23 For example, impressment had been a practice of the Royal Navy since 1803.  Id. at 37. 
24 Id. at 38   
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 WOOD, supra note 21, at 660. 
28 Id. 
29 BRADFORD PERKINS, PROLOGUE TO WAR: ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES, 1805-1812, at 
274, 279, 353–54, 395–96  (1968). 
30 Id. 
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The vote for the war in Congress was both very divided and, at first glance, rather 
puzzling.31  Those who voted in favor of war were predominantly from the South and West—
regions largely unaffected by Britain’s maritime malfeasance; those against the war were mostly 
from New England—a part of the country that bore the brunt of British abuses.32  Historians 
have posited many explanations for the perplexing plethora of Western and Southern support for 
the war: the young, bellicose “War Hawks” of the Twelfth Congress; a desire to expand into new 
territory; low grain prices.33  Regardless, one certainty persists: opinion of the war remained 
divided along party lines, with Republicans in support and Federalists ardently opposed. 
c. On the Danger of Factions: the Republican vs. Federalist Divide 
i. Pre-war Partisan Politics 
For the first several decades of the nineteenth century, the American political order 
centered around two parties: Republicans and Federalists.  The Republican Party, rooted in the 
wisdom of Jefferson and Madison, viewed themselves as guardians of the American 
experiment.34  Ever wary of the corroding influence of the British crown, as well as the 
ascendancy of the Federalists, Republicans advocated popular rule and a relatively weak federal 
authority.  
In juxtaposition, Federalists adopted a somewhat more elitist attitude.  Noted Republican 
James Madison claimed that Federalists considered the people to be “stupid, suspicious, 
licentious” and prone to “leaving the care of their liberties to their wiser rulers.”35  Furthermore, 
                                                 
31 In the House of Representatives, the vote was seventy-nine to forty-nine.  In the Senate the 
vote was nineteen to thirteen.  WOOD, supra note 21. 
32 WOOD, supra note 21, at 661. 
33 Id. 
34 WHAT SO PROUDLY WE HAILED, supra note 6, at xvi. 
35 4 GAILLARD HUNT,  THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, at 120 (1906). 
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whereas Republicans tended to favor an agrarian economy and remained apprehensive of an 
advanced economy—particularly one that might require trade with Britain—Federalists harbored 
no such reservations.36  Federalists viewed trade as a mutually profitable endeavor and favored 
economic development under a strong national government.37 
Republican idealism contributed to the unpreparedness of American forces at the start of 
the War of 1812.  Republicans deeply distrusted standing armies as threats to individual liberty.  
In true Republican form, Madison wrote that of “all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, 
the most to be dreaded.  War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and 
armies, debts, and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination 
of the few.”38  Senator John Taylor of Virginia succinctly claimed armies “squander money, and 
extend corruption.”39  Republican opposition to standing armies certainly did not derive from any 
opposition to war or violence.  In a letter to Madison, Jefferson himself mused that opponents of 
the War of 1812 should be either tarred and feathered or hanged.40  There was some irony in a 
party premised on support of the yeoman agrarian and dubious of a strong central authority 
calling for a national show of force seemingly to protect American commercial expansion.41 
d. Opinions of the War of 1812: Republican Fervor and Federalist Opposition 
                                                 
36 NIVOLA, supra note 8, at 13. 
37 For example, in a deal excoriated by Republicans, the Jay Treaty of 1794 called for a national 
bank, tariffs, and trade with Britain.  Id. at 14. 
38 JAMES MADISON, IV LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 491–92 (1865). 
39 Nivola, supra note 8, at 31 (quoting Risjord, supra note 20, at 109). 
40 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, June 29, 1812, Madison Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington (memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/Madison_papers/). 
41 Consider the Republican congressman from Tennessee, George Washington Campbell, who in 
1806 not only opposed American naval might to protect commerce but characterized the 
commerce itself as evil: “It would have been well for us if the American flag had never floated 
on the ocean … to waft to this country the luxuries and vices of European nations, that 
effeminate and corrupt our people.”  ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 9 Cong., 1 sess. (Mar. 11, 1806), 
706–07. 
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i. America’s Most Unpopular War 
Partisan divide permeated the political world of 1812.  In Congress, Federalists 
vehemently declined to support the war.  In An Address of Members of the House of 
Representatives…on the Subject of War with Great Britain, House Federalists attacked 
Republican attempts to silence opposition to the war as “toward tyranny” and so egregious that 
“principles more hostile…to…Representative liberty, cannot easily be conceived.” 42  In 
response, Republicans argued that rather than question the war, “every patriot’s heart must unite 
in its support.”43   
An economic downturn further fueled the flames of partisanship.  By 1814 the economy 
had soured and trade was near nonexistent.44  Due to ever-increasing expenses and lack of 
revenue, the public debt skyrocketed.  Eventually, the United States Treasury defaulted.45  
Indeed, Mott’s refusal to rendezvous occurred at the height of the young country’s economic 
difficulties, a period characterized as “…the lowest ebb in the financial history of the United 
                                                 
42 AN ADDRESS OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN, 
http://www.archive.org/stream/addressofmembers00sulluoft#page/n5/mode/2up (Last Accessed 
10:13, October 16, 2016). 
43 Washington National Intelligencer (June 27, 1812), http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-
search/we/HistArchive/HistArchive?d_viewref=doc&p_docnum=-
1&p_nbid=S60U5BVVMTM2ODIwMzQ4OS4yMjI2NTQ6MToxNDoxNDMuMjI5LjI0MC43
OA&f_docref=v2:1022477FF1D68B80@EANX-1038CEF095498890@2383057-
1038CEF0A6558FB2@0&toc=true&p_docref=v2:1022477FF1D68B80@EANX-
1038CEF095498890@2383057-1038CEF0A6558FB2@0 (Last Accessed 00:49, May 2, 2013).  
44 In 1814, exports had fallen to $7 million from $131 million in 1807.  Similarly, imports fell 
from $138 million in 1807 to $13 million by 1814.  Nivola, supra note 8, at 18. 
45 Id. 
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States.”46  The young country was deeply politically divided and economically unstable.  In some 
cities, mobs erupted in violence. 
ii. Republican Rage: Baltimore Edition  
One such city was Baltimore.  A profoundly pro-war Republican city, the Baltimore riots 
underscored the deeply partisan fissure over the unpopular war.  Anti-Federalist demonstrations 
were a common occurrence in Baltimore and frequently included prominent Republican city 
officials.  Given the extremely anti-Federalist atmosphere in Baltimore, many Federalists 
“considered Baltimore a dangerous example of democracy--the ‘headquarters of mobocracy’””47 
 Following the declaration of war, the vitriolic and ardently Federalist newspaper the 
Federal Republic announced its opposition to the war.  The paper scathingly labeled the war 
“unnecessary, inexpedient, and…bearing…marks of undisguised foreign influence.”48  The paper 
proceeded to pronounce that “we mean to use every constitutional argument and every legal 
means to render as odious and suspicious to the American people, as they deserve to be, the 
patrons and contrivers of this highly impolitic and destructive war.”49  On June 22, the paper’s 
offices were decimated by an angry mob.  Onlookers stood by and “contributed nothing to the 
                                                 
46 HARRY L. COLES, THE WAR OF 1812, at 238 (1965) (noting that “summer and fall of 1814 
…marked the lowest ebb in the financial history of the United States”). 
47 DONALD R. HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812: A FORGOTTEN CONFLICT, at 52 (Bicentennial ed. 
2012) (quoting THE WEEKLY REGISTER, VOL 3, at 47 (Hezekiah Niles ed., Sept. 19, 1812)). 
48 Baltimore Federal Republican, (June 20th 1812), reprinted in in THE WEEKLY REGISTER, VOL 
2, at 379 (Hezekiah Niles ed., Aug. 8, 1812) 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.32044092547975;view=1up;seq=7 (Last Accessed 
11:13, Oct. 19, 2016). 
49 Id. 
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protection of the rights guaranteed to the citizens by our form of government.”50  In Baltimore, 
neither the ideals of the Revolution, nor its heroes, were safe from the tyranny of the mob.51 
iii. Federalist Opposition: New York Style 
While Baltimore was home to deeply Republican pro-war sentiment, New York, where 
Mr. Mott lived, was quite the opposite.  As with much of the country, the War of 1812 divided 
New York.  In the 1812 elections, Republican fears materialized when Federalist majorities were 
elected both to the state assembly and to Congress.52  In preparation for war, Congress had 
passed a ninety-day trade embargo.53  The embargo caused panic in New York as the states 
surplus grain was all shipped abroad.54  Ships hurriedly loaded and left port before the law was 
                                                 
50 Report of the Committee of Grievances and Courts of Justice of the House of Delegates of 
Maryland on the Subject of the Recent Mobs and Riots in the City of Baltimore, Together with 
the Depositions Taken Before the Committee (1813), reprinted in EARLY AMERICAN IMPRINTS, 
SERIES 2: SHAW-SHOEMAKER, 1801-1819 http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-
search/we/Evans?p_action=doc&p_theme=eai&p_topdoc=1&p_docnum=1&p_sort=YMD_date:
D&p_product=SHAW&p_text_direct-
0=u433=(%2029064%20)|u433ad=(%2029064%20)&p_nbid=X52C4DPHMTM2ODIwMzM1N
y4zODc4MTE6MToxNDoxNDMuMjI5LjI0MC43OA&p_docref= (Last Accessed 00:57, May 
2, 2013). 
51 Even Revolutionary War heroes were not safe.  The eulogy of General Lingan would note the 
terrible irony in having a man who had valiantly fought for the Revolutionary cause die "under 
the appellation of a Tory."  George Washington Park Custis, An Address Occasioned by the 
Death of General Lingan, who was Murdered by the Mob at Baltimore (1812), reprinted in 
EARLY AMERICAN IMPRINTS, SERIES 2, SHAW-SHOEMAKER, 1801-1819 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-
search/we/Evans?p_action=doc&p_theme=eai&p_topdoc=1&p_docnum=1&p_sort=YMD_date:
D&p_product=SHAW&p_text_direct-
0=u433=(%2025199%20)|u433ad=(%2025199%20)&p_nbid=J54P4FCJMTM2ODIwNDY4Ni4
0OTIxMDQ6MToxNDoxNDMuMjI5LjI0MC43OA&p_docref= (Last Accessed 1:04, May 2, 
2013). 
52 Harvey Strum, New York Federalists and Opposition to the War of 1812, 142 WORLD AFFAIRS 
169, 170 (Winter 1980). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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fully implemented.55  The embargo was a Federalist talking point during the elections and helped 
garner them an eight seat majority in the state assembly.56  Besides the unpopular economic 
impact of the embargo, Federalists were also wary of the Republican desire to conquer Canada, 
noting that war would cause “ruin and disgrace and its only acquisition the … cold, inhospitable 
provinces of Canada and Nova Scotia.”57  Some New York Federalists even suggested that New 
York and New England should secede from the Union if the Republicans declared war.58 
The declaration of war provoked a largely panicked reaction in New York.  Citizens in 
the northern part of the stated largely absconded from the region due to fears of attacks by 
Canadian Indians.  While Federalists in frontier counties volunteered to serve in the militia, those 
in the Hudson and Mohawk valleys flatly refused.59  In a political calculation designed to 
mitigate Federalist opposition, pro-war Republican Governor Daniel Tompkins appointed a 
prominent New York Federalist, Stephen Van Rensselaer, commander of the militia.60 
Even under Van Rensselaer’s command the militia proved recalcitrant.  When Van 
Rensselaer attempted to summon the Chautauqua County militia it refused to be summoned as 
                                                 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. (quoting Buffalo Gazette, 22 April 1812). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 172. 
60 Id. (Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer was a rich and powerful Federalist commonly 
referred to as “the last of the patroons.”  HICKEY, supra note 47, at 85.  Born in New York City 
on November 1, 1764, Van Rensselaer served in both houses of the New York state legislature, 
and was elected lieutenant governor before serving as Major General during the war of 1812.  
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: STEPHEN VAN RENSSELAER III, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=V000056 (Last Accessed 10:23, 
December 20, 2016).  He would go on to found Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1824 and 
represent New York in Congress from 1822-29.  Id.  He died in Albany in 1839.  Id.). 
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“no valuable end would be answered by the intended draft.”61  Other efforts failed because far 
too few militiamen would rendezvous.  In one instance, General Wade Hampton ordered his 
force of 1,500 to attack Montreal and discovered only twenty-five men willing to go.  The rest 
simply made the long trek back to Albany.62  During another battle, 1,200 militiamen refused to 
cross the Niagara River to relieve troops pinned down by British forces.63  New York militiamen 
were obstinately opposed to the War.   
The insubordination of the New York militia was exacerbated by lack of food, gear, and 
shelter during the winter.  In some cases, insubordination became mutiny.  One officer reported 
that “[o]ne hundred and thirty … stacked their arms and marched off …out of a Brigade only 
part of a regiment is left.”64  In other instances, insubordination crossed from mutiny to pillaging 
fellow Americans.  In the winter of 1813-1814, as British troops ravaged Buffalo, the hastily 
fleeing militia reportedly robbed the similarly fleeing civilians.65  Western New York was largely 
deserted.  In later refusing to rendezvous, Jacob Mott followed a distinguished line of New York 
militiamen. 
As seen in Mott, Governor Tompkins established tribunals specifically to punish those 
who refused to serve in the militia.66  That said, New Yorkers remained obstinately opposed to 
military service.  New York Assemblyman Roswell Hopkins of St. Lawrence County—a frontier 
county even by modern standards—observed that his constituents generally refused to enter 
                                                 
61 Id. (quoting Letter from Chautauqua County Militia to Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer 
(September 12, 1812), reprinted in Ebenezer Foote Notebook (on file with the Chautauqua 
County Historical Society)). 
62 Id. at 178–79. 
63 Id. at 172. 
64 Id. (citing Canandaigua Ontario Repository, October 13, 1812; Goshen Orange County 
Patriot, October 27, 1812) 
65 Id. at 179. 
66 Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 21 (1827). 
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military service, “peaceably if they can, but forcibly if they must.”67  In a letter to Daniel 
Webster, Thomas Oakley (later the attorney for the plaintiff in Martin v. Mott) recounted how in 
1813 when Governor Tompkins ordered out the militia, many of the able-bodied men of 
Dutchess County fled to Connecticut and thereby avoided service.68  In fact, of the 5,000 
requested by the governor via the militia draft, only 1,500 responded.69  Republicans blamed 
their Federalist counterparts, who were themselves quick to note that neither Federalists nor 
Republicans heeded duty’s call.70  In short, New York offered an exquisite example of partisan 
fissure over the War of 1812. 
The political tensions of 1812 seized New York civic life as well.  Shortly after the 
declaration of war, New York Federalists began to fear rumors of Republican violence.  The 
news of the Baltimore riots spread north and some speculated there was an administration plan to 
silence anti-war Federalists.  Only New York City Mayor Dewitt Clinton’s assurances 
ameliorated Federalist concern.71  Clinton’s motives were not altogether altruistic.  Clinton 
desired Federalist support as he campaigned for president and in August of 1812 met with 
prominent Federalist leaders to that end.72  Reassured, the Federalists continued to hold 
numerous anti-war rallies through New York and denounced the conflict as ceding the country to 
the French.73  Federalists were further infuriated by news that the President had rejected a British 
                                                 
67 Strum, supra note 52, at 178 (quoting Albany Gazette, February 1, 1813). 
68 Letter from Thomas Oakley to Daniel Webster, (September 8, 1813) (on file with the Library 
of Congress). 
69 Strum, supra note 52, at 178. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 173. 
73 Among the rumors circulating in Federalist circles was one wherein Napoleon planned to send 
10,000 troops to the United States.  Id. 
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armistice offer.74  In the 1812 election, Republicans won eight seats while anti-war Federalists 
took nineteen seats in New York’s congressional delegation.75 
In 1813 the state of New York politics continued to be defined by partisan gridlock.  
Governor Tompkins asked the legislature for funds to create a voluntary corps (deemed more 
reliable than the militia), as well as for money to pay the state’s share of the federal war tax.  
While the Republican Senate approved the provisions, they failed in the Federalist assembly.76  
During the 1813 campaign for governor and state legislature, Federalists lauded the governors of 
Connecticut and Massachusetts for defiance of presidential requests to draft a militia to be used 
in federal service.77  Several reports of confrontations between citizens and soldiers were 
circulated by the Federalist press as evidence that the real war was being perpetrated against 
American citizens.78  The Federalist press took this opportunity to incorporate an element of 
nativism into the campaign and characterized the war as an effort to protect British residents 
while noting that Governor Tompkins had appointed numerous Irish-Americans to public 
office.79  The argument was made that the governor was subservient to a Southern Republican 
president who cared little for the troubles of the North.80  Governor Tompkins ultimately won 
reelection—but barely.81  Indicative of the contested nature of New York politics, Governor 
Tompkins’ margin of victory was a mere 3,606 votes.82 
                                                 
74 Such news only furthered Federalist conspiracy theories in which an alliance with the French 
was a natural conclusion.  Id. 
75 Id. at 174. 
76 Id. at 179. 
77 Id. at 175. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 RAY W. IRWIN, DANIEL D. TOMPKINS: GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 169 (The New York Historical Society, 1968). 
81 Id. at 170. 
82 Id. 
15 
 
During the 1814 congressional and state legislature campaigns, Federalists continued to 
rage against the war.  Federalists blamed Republicans for the British destruction of the Niagara 
Frontier and claimed that in the burned towns the sound of Native “war whoops awakens the 
sleep of the Cradle.”83  Not to be outdone, Republicans excoriated Federalists for opposition to 
the war effort.  Ultimately, the British destruction of Buffalo and the Niagara Frontier greatly 
contributed to a dominant Republican electoral showing: following the 1814 elections, 
Federalists held a mere six seats.84  Despite the blowout, tensions continued to simmer.  
Gouverneur Morris nearly provoked a riot by deriding Republicans for hating England, “the land 
of our … forefathers”85 and Federalists maintained that to “resist oppression is a duty to God.”86 
Politics was far from the only area of New York life gripped by the partisan clash over 
the war.  Federalists were not averse to trading with the British.  Convoys of goods were 
regularly sent across the Canadian border, some stretching over a mile.87  A customs collector in 
St. Lawrence County even admitted that his men—as well as some of the soldiers stationed 
there—frequently traded with the British.88  In June of 1814, the largest British force ever 
assembled in North America arrived in Canada.  As Governor-General of Canada and 
commander in chief of His Majesty’s forces in Canada, General Sir George Prevost was tasked 
with providing for the vast host.  The General noted that “[t]wo-thirds of the army…are supplied 
with beef by American contractors, principally of Vermont and New York.”89  Unsurprisingly, 
American leaders (military and otherwise) were enraged by the sustenance delivered the enemy.  
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Republican Elisha Jenkins even suggested that all livestock and produce within twenty miles of 
the Canadian border between Lake Champlain and Lake Ontario be confiscated.90  Major 
General George Izard forwarded a report of the smuggling to the War Department and added:  
This confirms a fact not only disgraceful to our countrymen but seriously detrimental to 
the public interest.  From the St. Lawrence to the ocean an open disregard prevails for the 
laws prohibiting intercourse with the enemy…On the eastern side of Lake Champlain the 
high roads are insufficient for the cattle pouring into Canada. Like herds of buffaloes they 
press through the forests, making paths for themselves.  Were it not for these supplies, the 
British forces in Canada would soon be suffering from famine.91 
 
Such disdain was not confined to letters.  The military occasionally clashed with civilian 
smugglers.  In one instance, a cohort of troops sent to imprison a smuggler instead found their 
Lieutenant jailed by local authorities.92  In another, customs officers and pro-war Republicans 
clashed with the Sheriff and anti-war Federalists over smuggled goods.93  Ultimately, the 
Federalists retained possession of the goods.94  Northern New Yorkers obdurately resisted any 
impediment of trade with the British. 
 In late August of 1814, news arrived in New York of the British blaze in Washington, 
D.C.  Federalists and Republicans temporarily united and constructed temporary fortifications 
around New York City.  Even former anti-war advocates appealed to the citizenry to unite under 
the cause of American independence.95  In October, news of Britain’s proffered peace terms 
reached New York.  The terms included an Indian buffer state in the Ohio Valley and the 
forfeiture of large swaths of Minnesota and Maine.96  The demands enraged Republicans and 
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many Federalists as well.  The Federalist editor Paraclete Potter noted that “[a]ll agree…they 
[British peace terms] cannot be accepted.”97   
That said, such patriotism was fleeting.  Northern New Yorkers continued to smuggle 
goods to the enemy and militiamen obeyed only when ordered to defend New York City.98  
General Jacob Brown noted that New Yorkers were largely opposed (much like Mr. Mott) to 
“exert themselves at a distance from their Farms.”99  When congressional Republicans attempted 
to solve their military problems through the draft, the bill failed.100  When New York state 
Republicans successfully passed a measure that made it more difficult to avoid the draft, any 
semblance of unity derived from the aftermath of the burning of Washington evaporated.  
Several thousand Federalists in Oneida County angrily protested the measure and Ontario 
County Federalists promised to resist enactment of the measure “even at the risk of our lives.”101  
In short, Mr. Mott’s refusal to rendezvous was less an isolated act of daring resistance than 
adhering to an established norm. 
II. THE PLAYERS 
A cursory analysis of Martin v. Mott, might mistakenly identify the core of the case as a 
yeoman farmer defying the powerful will of the political establishment.  As the hyper-partisan 
quality of the era indicates, Mott exemplified a reoccurring theme in New York.  Given the 
fractured political arena, the prominent players in Martin v. Mott warrant closer analysis. 
a. Governor Daniel D. Tompkins 
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The man to whom President James Madison issued his request for militiamen was 
Governor Daniel D. Tompkins of New York.  A New Yorker by birth, Tompkins would later 
become Vice President of the United States.102  As a young man at Columbia University, 
Tompkins became concerned with American politics.  Tompkins’ political views evoked the 
libertarian political theories of Montesquieu: 
1. “The design of Government is to insure the tranquillity [sic] of the members of the 
community.”  2.  It is extremely unlikely that this design may be carried out in an elective 
monarchy, and it is impossible in an hereditary one, chiefly because of the tendencies of 
monarchical governments to engage in warfare, to support luxury and debauchery, to 
display favoritism, and to give loose rein to arbitrary, corrupt, or innately incompetent 
officials.  3.  Republican government, which emerged later historically than the 
monarchical form, is open to fewer criticisms than monarchy.  4.  A vigilant people, 
possession a republican government, frequent free elections, and the right to make 
political changes, may readily safeguard the liberty, equality, and happiness to which 
they are naturally entitled.  5.  The “true spirit of equality,” in a political as opposed to 
natural sense, is something far removed from that “extreme equality” designed “to reduce 
all to a promiscuous level” politically and socially.  It consists, rather, in a recognition 
“that all citizens for whose benefits laws are enacted have an equal right to a share in 
forming them and an equal right to their protection and of benefits arising from them.”103 
 
By the time Tompkins left Columbia in 1795, he was already planning a career in 
politics.104  With both a well-connected father and a powerful, Republican father-in-law, 
Tompkins was well situated for civic involvement, which he commenced wholeheartedly during 
the campaign of 1800.105 
 At the turn of the century, New York politics was a microcosm of the forces at play on 
the national stage.  During the 1790s, Federalists under the leadership of New Yorker Alexander 
Hamilton struggled against the forces of Jeffersonian Republicanism.  In New York, allies of 
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Governor George Clinton (supported to a degree by Jefferson) wrestled with the Federalists John 
Jay and Hamilton.106  By the presidential election of 1800, it was clear that Republicans needed 
to carry New York.  Seventy electoral votes were required to win the presidency and 
Republicans could count on sixty-one.  It was therefore imperative that Republicans carry New 
York and its twelve electoral votes.107  Due in large part to the exhaustive efforts of New Yorker 
Aaron Burr, Republicans achieved overwhelming victory at the ballot box—both in New York 
and nationally.  Burr’s efforts were matched only by his protégé, young Tompkins.  Tompkins 
went so far as to jointly purchase property with thirty other enterprising young Republicans and 
thereby was able to vote—a suggestion that likely came from Burr himself.108  As only one-tenth 
of the men in New York owned enough property to vote, the scheme was exceedingly useful. 
 Having demonstrated considerable political acumen, Tompkins was chosen to represent 
New York City in the 1801 convention to revise the state Constitution.109  Tompkins’ role at the 
convention would do much to further his promising political career.  The Convention sought to 
fix the number of state senators at thirty-two and assemblymen at one hundred, forcing the 
Federalist minority to vacate eight senator seats.110  To Tompkins, it seemed unfair to deprive 
senators of their seats absent an elective process and so he crafted and submitted a plan to Chief 
Justice Smith Thompson for each party to vacate four seats by ballot.111  The plan was proposed 
and adopted by the Convention.112  Tompkins’ plan caught the attention of Alexander Hamilton, 
and inspired Hamilton to support Tompkins when Tompkins later sought appointment as a 
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justice of the Supreme Court of New York.113  Tompkins was elected to the state assembly in 
1803 and appointed to the Supreme Court of New York in 1804 in a move praised by both 
Republican and Federalist members of the bar.114  Tompkins himself enjoyed the court so much 
that when elected to Congress in 1804 he resigned so as to continue serving on the New York 
Supreme Court.115  He similarly declined appointment to the United States District Court in New 
York.116  Tompkins’ rise from property-less attorney to justice of the Supreme Court of New 
York was remarkably rapid.117  He was elected Governor in 1807.118 
 Letters from Tompkins’ tenure as governor reveal a staunch Republican who, partially 
through his support of Jefferson’s embargo, did much to ameliorate the party’s internal divide 
between North and South.  In one letter, Tompkins expounded on his views of the militia, stating 
that the “constitution and laws enjoin it as a duty on every person liable to perform Militia 
duty…the consequence of the neglect [of the militia] will be most prejudicial to the Inhabitants 
of the most exposed points of the State.”119  Tompkins was acutely aware of the utter chaos that 
defined New York’s militia system, as well as the importance of the militia to public safety.  In 
his first address before the state legislature in 1808, Tompkins asked for amendments to the 
existing militia legislation, and urged cooperation with federal efforts to protect New York.120 
The address was far from Tompkins’ last act of leadership with regard to the militia.  He 
served as a liaison between the state legislature and the War Department and was intimately 
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involved in planning the construction of federal fortifications around New York.121  Indeed, 
Tompkins’ support of Jefferson, even in the face of an increasingly popular Federalist party in 
New York, was unwavering and duly appreciated.122  After an 1810 address before the 
legislature wherein Tompkins outlined America’s relations with Europe, the Federalist assembly 
denounced both the address and President Madison’s foreign and fiscal policies.123  Governor 
Tompkins issued a forceful reply in defense of the President that same day.124  Tompkins would 
frequently feud with the Federalist dominated assembly as he advocated for stronger war 
policy.125 
Given Governor Tompkins attempts to reform the mess that was the New York militia, 
his support for active courts-martial is hardly surprising.  That said, Tompkins oft-reiterated his 
wish that the proceedings be just and avoid excessively punitive sentences for those with valid 
excuses.  In an 1813 letter to General James Wilkinson, Governor Tompkins observed that: 
The impunity of those of the Militia who neglected to rendezvous, or who put the laws at 
defiance in 1812, has had a most injurious effect, & has afforded a subject of great 
murmuring to those who under great hardships endured the service which the good of 
their Country exacted from them.  I hope that cause of complaint will not exist during this 
Campaign, but that you will cause a Court to be organized forthwith for the trial of 
Militia delinquents.  Without being instructed especially upon that subject, the Judge 
Advocate perhaps will, as in my opinion he ought, counsel & advise the Court, that 
sickness of family, extreme poverty, infirmity of body or other circumstances which 
would have made it distressing for a Militiaman to leave home, constitutes an equitable & 
reasonable excuse; & that the arm of Justice should fall heavily upon those only who are 
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able bodied & comfortable in point of propriety, & who shrink from duty through 
negligence, perverseness, cowardice, or contempt of the laws.126 
 
Although opposed to insubordination, Governor Tompkins understood that not all 
militiamen were similarly situated. 
b. The Parties: Michael Martin and Jacob E. Mott  
The parties before the Supreme Court were Michael Martin and Jacob E. Mott.127  
Exceedingly little is known about either individual.  Records from the New York trial court, 
indicate that the plaintiff in error, Martin, was a gentleman from the town of Red Hook in 
Dutchess County.128  In the avowry to the New York Supreme Court defending his appropriation 
of Mott’s property, Martin explained that on August 6, 1818, the marshal for the Southern 
District of New York, Thomas Morris, Esq., appointed Martin his lawful deputy.129  In that 
capacity, it was Martin’s duty to serve and execute the orders of the courts martial.130  The 
defendant in error, Mott, was a farmer who hailed from the town of Clinton, also in Dutchess 
County.131  As the case clearly encapsulated a larger struggle over Federal-State relations and 
political partisanship, both parties were represented by distinguished counsel. 
c. The Lawyers 
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i. Counsel for the Plaintiff in Error: Mr. Coxe and Attorney General William 
Wirt. 
When Martin v. Mott arrived in the Supreme Court on February 9, 1824, Mr. Martin was 
represented by an attorney named George Shufeldt.132  Little is known about Mr. Shufeldt other 
than that he was admitted to the bar in 1816, was subsequently admitted as a counselor and 
solicitor at chancery in 1819, and was registered and practiced in Red Hook, Dutchess County, 
New York.133  It appears that Mr. Martin, also a resident of Red Hook, merely contacted a local 
attorney.  Regardless, by the time the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. 
Martin certainly had the benefit of high-powered representation.   
Before the Supreme Court Mr. Martin was represented by two experienced lawyers.  The 
first, Mr. Coxe, is something of a mystery.  Mr. Coxe’s co-counsel was none other than the 
acting United States Attorney General, William Wirt.  A former member of the Virginia House 
of Delegates, Mr. Wirt first achieved distinction when President Thomas Jefferson appointed him 
prosecutor in the 1807 treason trial of Aaron Burr.134  Wirt previously collaborated with Mr. 
D.B. Ogden (Mott’s attorney), as Wirt (along with Daniel Webster) represented Thomas Gibbons 
in Gibbons v. Ogden135, a case where Mr. Ogden made an opening statement.  In fact, Wirt 
figured prominently in four of the Marshall Court’s most consequential decisions.136  Besides 
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Gibbons, Wirt (again, with Webster) opposed Maryland’s attempt to tax the Bank of the United 
States in McCulloch v. Maryland137; in Dartmouth College v. Woodward138, Wirt lost (this time 
against Webster); in Cohens v. Virginia139 Wirt played a minor role in defining the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.   
When Wirt retired from his post as Attorney General, he moved to Baltimore where he 
had an established legal practice.  In 1832 due to a dearth of opposition to Jeffersonian 
Republicans (then called Democrats), Wirth ran as the Anti-Masonic candidate for president; he 
received the electoral votes solely of Vermont.140  In general, Wirt seemed to prefer arguing in 
favor of the power of the Federal Government and his position in Martin v. Mott reflects that 
tendency.141 
ii. Thomas J. Oakley 
When Martin v. Mott was filed in the Supreme Court in 1824, Mott was represented by 
Thomas J. Oakley, an accomplished public figure in New York.142  Oakley too had argued in 
Gibbons, albeit unsuccessfully.  Oakley had been elected to Congress as an ardent anti-war 
Federalist from the Poughkeepsie District in 1813.143  Although against the war, colleagues 
remembered him as a cool, collected individual gifted with immense foresight and intellectual 
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prowess.144  Following his death in 1857, former New York Republican congressman and peer, 
Judge Jabez Delano Hammond, eulogized Oakley:  
“As a clear, ingenious, and logical, though sometimes sophisticated reasoner, he has 
appeared to me unrivaled in our legislative halls at Albany…his perfect self-command 
peculiarly fit him for a party leader in a legislative assembly.  In Congress he differed 
from the over-zealous Eastern Federalists.  He wished, at least, to manifest an apparent 
disposition to furnish supplies to Government, in carrying on the war, and to confine his 
opposition to the manner in which the war was carried on.  Mr. Clayton, an old and 
sagacious Virginia politician, told me, in 1816, that, had the Federal members of 
Congress, during the war, put themselves exclusively under the management of Oakley, 
and implicitly followed his lead, in his judgment the Administration would have been 
prostrated.”145 
   
Oakley stayed in Congress until 1815 when he went to the State Assembly.  In 1819, 
Oakley replaced a young Martin Van Buren as New York State Attorney General.  Although 
evidence suggests Oakley’s forceful Federalist views somewhat softened with age, his decision 
not to argue Martin v. Mott was likely due to a successful 1827 campaign for Congress rather 
than any philosophical misgivings.146 
iii. Mr. D.B. Ogden 
In place of Oakley, Mott’s 1827 defense was made by Mr. David Bayard Ogden.147  Mr. 
Ogden was born on October 31, 1775 in Morrisania, New York.148  An eminently qualified 
attorney, Chief Justice Roger Taney referred to Ogden as the “Sledge Hammer of the Court” due 
to the directness and simplicity of his arguments.149  In Gibbons v. Ogden , Mr. Ogden made 
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opening statements on behalf of the Appellant.150  Renowned American attorneys Daniel 
Webster and Henry Clay were amongst Ogden’s peers.151  In January of 1814—that is, at the 
time of Mott’s defiance—Mr. Ogden served New York in the still Federalist-dominated state 
assembly.152  Furthermore, Mr. D.B. Ogden’s voting record indicates that he was generally in 
accord with Mr. Stephen Van Rensselaer—a famed Federalist.153  Mr. Ogden was therefore 
likely a Federalist and exceptionally familiar with the problem-plagued militia—in short, a man 
sympathetic to Mr. Mott’s plight. 
d. Justice Joseph Story 
Of the many legal architects who graced the early American bench, the legacy of Justice 
Joseph Story is surpassed solely by his friend and mentor Chief Justice John Marshall.154  Justice 
Story’s contributions to American jurisprudence—particularly with regard to constitutional 
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interpretation and the powers of the national government—were gargantuan.155  His 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States is a seminal work of American 
constitutional law.156 
One of eighteen children, Justice Story hailed from Marblehead, Massachusetts.157  The 
youngest justice ever to sit on the Supreme Court, Justice Story fervently supported the central 
canons of the Federalist Party.158  In one of his earliest, yet arguably most well known opinions, 
Justice Story articulated an ardently nationalist understanding of judicial power in Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee.159  The Court advanced the purview of federal courts to review the decisions of 
state courts in all cases concerning the United States Constitution.160  According to Justice Story, 
the Supreme Court provided necessary oversight of state tribunals’ constitutional 
jurisprudence.161  Justice Story clearly favored a and a strong national authority. 
By 1833 when Justice Story authored Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States, his views reflected those articulated in Mott.162  In his Commentaries, Justice Story noted 
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the need for a well regulated militia and articulated some apprehension of standing armies.163  
Although appreciative of the role of the militia, Story noted that the Federal Government had 
only called it out twice, the War of 1812 being one such occasion.164  In all other instances, the 
states had retained control.165  Still, Story proceeded to reiterate the central tenets of Mott—
namely that the Militia Act of 1795 was constitutional and had delegated exclusive discretionary 
power to the President to act in the case of national emergency.166  Justice Story clearly 
considered his holding in Mott an indispensable defense of the American system of ordered 
liberty.  Through his Commentaries, Mott has persevered as an integral aspect of American 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
III. MARTIN V. MOTT 
a. The Case 
The Supreme Court record, comfortably ensconced in the recesses of the National 
Archives, fortunately includes the opinions of the New York courts.  The facts found in the trial 
court record are a slightly more detailed edition of those found in the Supreme Court record.  
According to the trial court, Governor Tompkins ordered out the militia via two orders on 
August 4 and 29, 1814.167  Private Mott subsequently refused to rendezvous.168  Toward the end 
of September, 1814, Major General Morgan Lewis convened a court martial.169  The court 
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martial was empowered to adjudicate cases through May 13, 1818.170  As told by the trial court, 
Mott did not appear before the court martial until May 30, 1818.171  At his hearing, Mott was 
fined ninety-six dollars and threatened with one year in prison should he fail to pay.172 
On August 6, 1818, Michael Martin was appointed a deputy marshal for the Southern 
District of New York by Thomas Morris, Esq.173  As deputy marshal, it was Martin’s 
responsibility to execute the orders of the courts martial.174  On June 4, 1819 (over a year after 
Mott’s initial sentencing and also after the sentence was approved by President Monroe), Martin 
visited Mott in order to acquire payment of the fine.175  Rather than take the ninety-six dollars, 
Martin dispossessed Mott of a brown mare.176  Mott then brought an action in replevin to recover 
personal property allegedly wrongfully taken.177  Unlike other types of legal recovery, replevin 
seeks return of the actual chattel itself (or in specie), as opposed to damages.178  Although the 
record never explicitly states that Martin seized the horse in lieu of the ninety-six dollar fine, the 
resultant law suit suggests that such a substitution occurred. 
In the New York Supreme Court, Mott claimed he sustained damage in the value of $300 
due to Martin’s appropriation of the brown mare and sought return of the mare in specie.179  As 
Mott was a farmer, he likely relied on the horse for his livelihood.180  The court ultimately 
awarded Mott $146.34.  The judgment was subsequently affirmed by the Court for the Trial of 
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Impeachments and Correction of Errors in an opinion which merely reiterated Mott’s issues with 
the avowry.181  Martin then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
i. The Jurisdictional Question 
The property law oriented underpinnings of the case explain the jurisdictional decision to 
try the case in state court.  Property law is typically adjudicated on a state by state basis.  Given 
the extreme unpopularity of the War in New York, Mott’s counsel likely made a strategic 
decision to bring the case in a potentially sympathetic state court.  Indeed, the New York courts 
treated the case as a property issue and left the question of Mott’s defiance relatively 
untouched.182  By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, it encapsulated the 
disorganization that dominated militia affairs during the War of 1812.       
The United States Constitution divides responsibility for the militia.183  Although the 
federal government is empowered to use state militias, state governments retain the rights to 
appoint officers and train the militia according to federally dictated discipline.184  During the 
War of 1812, coordination of training was far from uniform and organization of the militia at the 
state level varied widely.185  More significantly, there was no “clear definition of the proper 
relationship of state versus federal authority over the militia in war time.”186  As a result, 
numerous disputes arose over what power was properly authorized to call the militia into service, 
pay them, equip them, organize them, and determine their use.187  In rendering its opinion, the 
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Supreme Court took issue with the state courts’ opinions and attempted to lend some coherence 
to the militia system. 
b. The Court’s Reasoning 
In Martin v. Mott, the Supreme Court overturned the New York court’s decision in favor 
of Mott and remanded. 188  The Court addressed each of Mott’s nineteen complaints regarding 
the deficiency of the avowry.189  In general, Mott’s complaints are divisible into two primary 
attacks: one concerning the power of the President and the sufficiency of the requisition, the 
other regarding the jurisdiction of the court martial.190  The Court noted the constitutional power 
of Congress over the militia, emphasized the executive power of the President, established the 
jurisdiction of the court martial, and ultimately concluding the avowry sufficient.191 
i. The Court’s Analysis of Mott’s Complaints Regarding the Executive 
Power of the President and the Sufficiency of the Requisition 
Writing for the Court, Justice Joseph Story first established the constitutional power of 
Congress to provide for the militia.192  The Court noted that the Militia Act of 1795193 which 
authorized the President to call out the militia fell well within the constitutional power of 
Congress.194  Justice Story described the power confided in the President by Congress to order 
out the militia as “of a very high and delicate nature.”195  The Court next addressed the nature of 
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the President’s power to order out the militia.  The unanimous opinion related that “[w]e are all 
of the opinion, that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively 
to the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons.”196 
The Court grounded its reasoning in the very nature of the President’s power to order out 
the militia.  Key to the Court’s decision was the fact that national emergencies are precisely the 
sort of occurrence best handled by a unilateral act of power rather than through a laborious 
democratic process.197  The Court construed the President’s executive power in a manner 
designed to ensure the preservation of the Union.198  Were the President not the sole judge of a 
national exigency’s existence, an emergency could destroy the Union while its very existence 
was still being debated.199  In short, to interpret the President’s powers in any other way could 
prove ruinous to the country.200  Indeed, the Court unanimously held it a sound rule of 
construction that whenever a statute confers discretionary power on an individual to be exercised 
by the individual upon his own interpretation of certain facts, the individual is constituted the 
sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.201 
The Court greatly downplayed the possibility that the President’s power to unilaterally 
diagnose and address national emergencies would be abused.202  According to the Court, all 
powers are susceptible to abuse.203  The remedy, held the Court, is the American constitutional 
system.204  The Court argued that in a free government, the executive must be presumed devoted 
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to the public good; furthermore, frequent and free elections as well a watchful Congress “carry 
with them all the checks which can be useful to guard against usurpation or wanton tyranny.”205  
To reiterate this point, Justice Story referenced Vanderheyden v. Young, a New York Supreme 
Court case.206 
The Court further held it not necessary for the President to furnish any evidence in 
support of his determination of a national emergency.207  Despite the fact that the plaintiffs in 
both Mott and Vanderheyden contended that the President must actually provide evidence, the 
Court held that the President is presumed to have acted lawfully.208  Furthermore, the Court 
rejected Mott’s complaint that the orders of the President were not actually set forth and that the 
avowant did not actually aver that the President issued any orders.209  In short, the Court held it 
unnecessary for there to be an explicit official order; it sufficed that the Governor claimed he 
acted on the President’s requisition.210   
ii. The Court’s Rejection of Mott’s Allegations of the Illegality of the Court 
Martial Proceedings. 
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Mott made many claims regarding the illegality of the court martial proceedings.211  The 
Court began with Mott’s complaint that the court martial was not lawfully constituted and did 
not have jurisdiction.212  Mott alleged that as he was never technically employed in the service of 
the United States (that is, he had refused to enter the service) he was not liable to the Articles of 
War or to be tried by a court martial.213  The Court responded that such suggestion was 
conclusively rebutted by Houston v. Moore.214 
Mott’s next major claim centered on the make-up of the court martial—namely, that it 
did not have enough officers.215  The Court noted that the legislation (the Militia Act of 1795) 
did not specify how many officers were necessary but that the Articles of War did provide for 
somewhere between five and thirteen officers and left the ultimate decision as to the exact 
number up to the discretion of the convening officer.216  The Court further observed that the 
avowry actually provided a reason as to why there were only six officers and that the demurrer 
admitted the validity of the reason.217  In short, Mott’s claim of illegality was without merit. 
At this point the Court, having seemingly dispended with Mott’s claim as to the illegality 
of the composure of the court martial, could have moved on.  However, the opinion continued to 
further dismantle Mott’s assertion.  First, the Court noted that the range of officers provided for 
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by the Articles of War was only for the armies of the United States.218  Second, the Court noted 
that although the fifth section of the Militia Act of 1795 extended the power of court martials to 
those not yet in the service of the United States, it merely allowed for the applicability of the 
Articles of War to those militiamen employed in the service of the United States.219  That is, 
although the Militia Act of 1795 extended the power of courts martials to militiamen pre-
rendezvous, the Articles of War only applied to militiamen post-rendezvous.  In short, no explicit 
guidance as to the composition of the courts martial extended to those situations involving 
individuals like Mott (not yet in the service of the United States but still subject to courts martial 
pursuant to the fifth section of the Militia Act of 1795).  The Articles of War were merely to 
guide the discretion of the officer convening the court martial.220  According to the Court, 
“general usage of the military service, or what may not unfitly be called the customary military 
law” should  govern the appointment and composure of courts martial.221  In an effort to 
foreclose all legal recourse to Mott, the Court similarly rejected the applicability of the Act of 
April 18, 1814 holding the language obviously confined to those already in the actual service of 
the United States.222 
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The Court similarly rejected Mott’s claim that the fine was not approved by the 
commanding officer in the manner obligated by the Articles of War.223  The Court first stated 
that approval was not necessary because—as they had already established—the Articles of War 
served as mere guidelines with regard to militiamen not yet in the service.224  Furthermore, the 
Court noted that Mott’s punishment had been approved by none other than the President of the 
United States and as the highest ranking military official, the President’s approval more than 
sufficed.225  The Court concluded its line of reasoning by musing that the meaning of the Militia 
Act of 1795 was by no means lucid, and that the Court could infer that the fines did not demand 
official approval.226 
Finally, the Court rejected Mott’s argument that the court martial occurred in times of 
peace.227  The Court held that the Militia Act of 1795 extended to times of peace.  Indeed, the 
precise power of the Act authorized the President to call out the militia in times of peace.  As 
penned by Justice Story, “[i]t would be a strained construction of the act, to limit the authority of 
the Court to the mere time of the existence of a particular exigency…there is no such limitation 
in the act itself.”228 
c. The Enduring Significance of Martin v. Mott 
i. Groundbreaking Precedent 
In Martin v. Mott, the Court employed a broad reading of congressional power under the 
First Militia Clause, emphasized the constitutionality of the Militia Act of 1795, and advanced 
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the President’s discretionary power to impose martial law.229  The Court’s unanimous opinion in 
Martin v. Mott has endured as a foundational case of American executive emergency power 
jurisprudence.230  Although the opinion in Mott explicitly dealt with the authority of the Militia 
Act and the President, the implied issue was the power to ensure proper execution of the law.231 
The power to ensure proper execution of the laws would later rear its ahead in Luther v. 
Borden,232 an 1849 case similarly cited as a cornerstone case of American executive power case 
law.233  Luther v. Borden resulted from Dorr’s rebellion, wherein Martin Luther attempted to 
overthrow the established government of Rhode Island.234  The pertinent question before the 
Luther Court was whether the Supreme Court of the United States could review President John 
Tyler’s decision to quell the insurrection under the Guarantee Clause of the Federal 
Constitution.235 
 The Court held it the duty of Congress to oversee the President’s determination as to the 
existence of “domestic violence.”236  However, as noted by Chief Justice Roger Taney in his 
majority opinion, Congress had delegated its authority to make claims regarding “domestic 
violence” to the President via the Militia Act of 1795.237  Echoing Justice Story’s opinion in 
Mott, Chief Justice Taney further noted that “the power of deciding whether the exigency had 
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arisen upon which the government of the United States is bound to interfere, is given to the 
President.”238  In light of the Court’s unanimous opinion in Mott, the Luther Court held that the 
President’s power was not subject to review by the courts.239 
 Just as in Mott, the Luther Court held that the power to decide whether insurrection 
warranted calling out the militia was exclusively the province of the executive.240  Both Courts 
founded the executive authority in the Militia Acts.241  The Presidents could act as he had 
because Congress had authorized it.242  Remarkably, Luther espoused the notion that martial law 
had a constitutional basis.243  At the time, few seemed aware of the claim.244 
ii. Mott during the Civil War 
The influence of the Mott decision on executive emergency powers was again evident 
during the Civil War.245  In order to impose martial law, President Lincoln greatly relied on Ex 
parte Field, a case that cited both Mott and Luther as precedent.  As stated in Field: 
[t]he principle established by these cases [Mott and Luther] determines, I think, that the 
president has the power, in the present military exigencies of the country, to proclaim 
martial law, and, as a necessary consequence thereof, the suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus in the case of military arrests. It must be evident to all, that martial law and the 
privilege of that writ are wholly incompatible with each other.246 
 
President Lincoln’s Attorney General, Edward Bates, also cited Mott for the proposition 
that the President could detain and remove rebel combatants from the battle field until the 
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exigency had passed.247  Attorney General Bates argued that as the President was “the guardian 
of the Constitution—its preserver, protector and defender,” he was empowered to take whatever 
actions necessary to protect the United States.248  Mott clearly continued to have enduring 
influence with regard to executive emergency powers.  Attorney General Bates would not be the 
last to employ such reasoning.249  
iii. The Contemporary Understanding of Mott 
Since Attorney General Bates’ opinion, every Presidential administration has asserted 
that it is the President’s prerogative under the Constitution to protect American interests and that 
congressional approval is not necessary.250  Through Attorney General Bates’ analysis, Mott has 
influenced the contemporary understanding of executive war powers.  Much as Justice Story’s 
opinion held it the sole and exclusive power of the President to diagnose and dispose of national 
emergencies, modern administrations contend that the power to use the military to protect 
American interests similarly does not demand explicit congressional approval.251   
In 2011 and early 2012, President Obama twice called out the United States military 
without explicit Congressional approval.252  In the former instance, Seal Team Six killed Osama 
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bin Laden; in the latter instance, Seal Team Six rescued aid workers held hostage by pirates in 
Mogadishu, Somalia.253  In neither instance, was congressional approval sought.  While the bin 
Laden assassination was subsequently validated as part of the congressionally authorized War on 
Terror, the latter military operation was not.254  In short, the Somalia expedition was a 
unilaterally authorized use of American military might.255  The lack of public outcry can in part 
be explained by history dating back to Mott. 
IV. Conclusion 
Although contemporary usage cites it for its interpretation of the President’s emergency 
powers, Martin v. Mott encapsulated many of the themes sweeping early nineteenth century 
America.  The case arose out of Federalist opposition to the War of 1812, and ultimately 
solidified the national government’s authority.  Besides the relative paucity of information 
concerning the parties in Mott, the case begs the question of what limits would currently be 
imposed on a President in a true domestic crisis.256  The answer, according to at least some 
scholars, is unclear.257 
The constitutional basis for martial law asserted by Mott through Luther, coupled with the 
modern approach to protecting American interests via unilaterally authorized military force 
suggests few, if any, real limits governing a President faced with an actual domestic 
emergency.258  Mott envisioned Congress as a check on the President’s ability to abuse his 
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power.259  That said, what if Congress cannot be convened?260  What if (as will be the case on 
January 20, 2017) Congress agrees with the President?261  What role do the courts play?262  In 
short, the power of the President during a true national crisis is ill-defined and murky at best.  In 
that light, Martin v. Mott remains relevant.  
V. Appendix 
a. Biographical Information: President James Madison 
Born in 1751 in Orange County, Virginia, few have left a more indelible legacy than the 
fourth President of the United States, James Madison.263  Madison’s views on governance 
evolved wildly.  Following his graduation from Princeton, Madison was a frequent and emphatic 
participant at the 1776 constitutional Convention.264  In the 1780s as the “Father of the 
Constitution,” Madison was a zealous nationalist who distrusted states and yearned to subjugate 
them to the authority of a central government.265  By the 1790s Madison was a staunch states’ 
rights advocate who feared the tyrannical tendencies of the federal government.  To that end, he 
cofounded (along with Thomas Jefferson) the Democratic-Republican party.  In juxtaposition to 
the Madison of the 1780s who viewed states as mere administrative units in the federal scheme, 
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the Madison of the 1790s upheld the states as the last bastion against unconstitutional exercises 
of federal power.266   
Historians have struggled to reconcile Madison’s seemingly diametrically opposed 
political views.267  Perhaps the most persuasive perspective of Madison is of an idealistic 
Republican, reluctant to cultivate a strong national government.268  As President Jefferson’s 
Secretary of State, Madison complained to France and Britain that their seizure of American 
ships violated international law.269  John Randolph acerbically noted that this had the effect of “a 
shilling pamphlet hurled against eight hundred ships of war.”270  Elected president in 1808, 
Madison might have been properly prepared for the War of 1812 had he more aggressively 
advanced a strong national agenda.  Instead, apprehensive of debt, taxation, and standing armies, 
Madison and fellow Republicans relied on economic measures and a near fanatical faith in state 
militias.271  
Madison retired to his Orange County, Virginia estate where he died in 1836.272  In a 
note opened posthumously, Madison stated, “[t]he advice nearest to my heart and deepest in 
my convictions is that the Union of the States be cherished and perpetuated.”273 
b. Biographical Information: Major General Morgan Lewis 
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In 1814, Governor Tompkins would empower Major General Morgan Lewis to convene a 
court martial—one that ultimately heard the case of Jacob E. Mott.  Major General Morgan 
Lewis was born in New York on October 16, 1754. 274  His father (a successful merchant and a 
signer of the Declaration of Independence) was frequently away on business and so he was 
largely raised by his mother.275  A serious student, Lewis enrolled in Princeton College, where 
one of his closest companions was none other than James Madison.276  Upon his graduation from 
Princeton, Lewis intended to join the clergy.277  His father urged him to pursue a law degree.278  
As Lewis was preparing to travel to England to study, the Revolutionary War broke out and 
Lewis volunteered for the service.279  In 1776, his prodigious military talents were recognized 
when he was appointed Quarter-Master general of the Northern army.280  Lewis was elected 
Governor of New York in 1804.281  A Republican, he was subsequently defeated by Daniel D. 
Tompkins in a campaign remarkably devoid of controversy.282 
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